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“We have only an outline of our duties written; we are to be guided by
the living oracles.” —Wilford Woodruff1
“The judges in the several courts of justice . . . are the depositary of the
laws; the living oracles . . .” —William Blackstone2
I
Mormon thinkers have a problem. Suppose that a Latter-day Saint
were interested in learning what his or her religion has to say about
some contemporary philosophical, social, or political issue.
Where should a Mormon thinker begin? Consider the counter-ex-
ample of Catholic intellectuals. Faced with such a question, they
have the luxury of a rich philosophical and theological tradition
on which to draw. They can turn to Aquinas or modern Catholic
social thought and find there a set of closely reasoned proposi-
tions and arguments to apply to the questions before them. To be
sure, the task of such a thinker is not simply to “look up” the an-
swer, but Catholic intellectuals do have a religious tradition that
has been digested over the centuries in intellectual categories that
lend themselves easily to analysis and extension into new areas.
This option, however, is not open to a Latter-day Saint. Mormon-
ism—despite some important exceptions3—has largely eschewed
closely reasoned systematic theology. As one sympathetic Catholic
observer has written, “I have found it difficult to try to understand
the complex relationships between philosophy and theology in
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Mormon thought.”4 To which I would respond, “Join the club.”
Given the difficulties presented by what is at best a nascent philo-
sophical tradition, Mormon thinkers interested in offering a “Mor-
mon perspective” on an issue such as the nature of property or the
proper forms of political reasoning, for example, face a method-
ological problem. How does one begin looking for Mormon re-
sources from which to construct such perspectives? Indeed, on
many issues it would seem at first glance that Mormon thinkers
might be justified in concluding that Mormonism just doesn’t
have much of anything to say.
To be sure there is a voluminous body of Mormon writing on
many subjects, but the overwhelming majority of this work is
homiletic and is meant to inspire and motivate its audience rather
than provide them with careful conceptual analysis. Further-
more, when one looks to the content of this work, one finds that
much of it consists of narrative rather than exposition. Richard
Bushman has observed that “Mormonism is less a set of doctrines
than a collection of stories.”5 Indeed, the central obsession of
Mormon intellectual life for the last half century has not been sys-
tematic theology but history. One might point to any number of
things to underline the centrality of history for Mormon thought.
One example will suffice. The relationship between faith and
reason is a perennial question for religious thinkers. Generally
speaking, these debates are couched in the language of philoso-
phy. The question is, as Alvin Plantinga has put it, whether or not
belief is rationally warranted.6 In contrast, the most sophisticated
and prolonged debates within Mormonism on the relative claims
of faith and unaided human reason have been cast as battles be-
tween “faithful history” and “secular history.”7 Where other tra-
ditions debate epistemology and theology, Mormons debate his-
toriography and historicity. Accordingly, one response to the
methodological problem facing Mormon intellectuals discussed
above would be the interpretation of history in normative terms.
Indeed, we can see something like this in the work of writers such
as Hugh Nibley who look to historical narratives about nine-
teenth-century Zion-building as a basis for social criticism.8 Such
efforts, however, are dogged by persistent anxieties about the in-
tellectual respectability of using the past as a springboard for
broader conceptual or normative discussions. For many profes-
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sional historians and the Mormon intellectuals who take them as
models, straying beyond concrete debates over sources,
chronology, and their interpretation smacks of apologetics or
sectarian rather than “scholarly” history.
The two quotations at the beginning of this essay point toward
a related but slightly different response to the methodological
quandary of Mormon thinkers. Wilford Woodruff taught, “We
have only an outline of our duties written; we are to be guided by
the living oracles.”9 On its face, this seems like a fairly standard ap-
peal to the authority of Mormonism’s living prophets. The con-
trast between “living oracles” and the mere “outline of duties” that
is actually written down, however, suggests a second point. The for-
mal, propositional content of Mormon scripture, it would seem,
provides no more than a framework in which the concrete mean-
ing of Mormonism is worked out by the inspired fiat of Mormon
leaders. While Joseph Smith produced a mass of scriptural narra-
tive, subsequent Mormon prophets—with notable exceptions such
as Joseph F. Smith’s vision of the redemption of the dead (D&C
138)—have made their weight felt less in terms of new sacred stories
than in terms of new institutions and practices. Strikingly, Brigham
Young’s sole contribution to the formal Mormon canon is a revela-
tion on the structure of immigrant trains (D&C 136). He—like most
of his successors—spent the bulk of his energies on the delineation
of Mormon practices and institutions.
What Mormons see in this history is the accretion of many de-
cisions in concrete historical situations made by wise and inspired
leaders. The result is a set of practices and institutions that they
regard as imbued with the divine, even when the practices and in-
stitutions cannot be shown to be deduced in any unproblematic
manner from sacred texts, theological first principles, or dra-
matic moments of charismatic revelation. The same is true of the
activities of Latter-day Saint leaders who have not reached the top
of the hierarchy. They too have been involved mainly in the execu-
tion and building up of a set of practices and institutions. Accord-
ingly, Bushman’s view of Mormonism as a collection of stories
must be updated. Mormonism is also a set of practices and institu-
tions. This fact points toward another answer to the methodologi-
cal dilemma of Mormon thinkers: legal interpretation, particu-
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larly the methods of interpretation used in the judge-made com-
mon law.10
II
According to Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., “It is the merit of the
common law that it decides the case first and determines the prin-
ciple afterwards.”11 Like most Holmesian aphorisms, this state-
ment is open to multiple interpretations; however, it rightly insists
that the common law is first and foremost about resolving con-
crete disputes. A common-law judge seldom finds himself an-
nouncing abstract principles for their own sake. Rather, he is gen-
erally concerned with the question of doing right in the particular
case before him or at most with interstitial modifications of exist-
ing law. The resolution of the case will depend on analogies to
past cases and the judge’s own wisdom and intuitions about jus-
tice. It is only after the piling up of innumerable particular cases
that the abstract rules of legal doctrine emerge.
Hence, it is uncontroversial to claim that, for example, in the
case of conf lict between a written contract and the parties’ oral
testimony about the content of their agreement, the writing will
control.12 This rule, however, was never announced in a distinct,
legislative moment. Rather, it is an accepted generalization that
captures the outcomes of hundreds of preexisting cases. Finally, it
is only after the myriad of particular cases have been organized
into a doctrinal structure of abstract legal rules that a common
law thinker might try to discern within, say, the law of contracts a
set of normative choices, such as a general preference for eco-
nomic efficiency, personal autonomy, or transactional fairness.13
Hence, as Blackstone wrote, common law judges are “living ora-
cles” who declare the law in particular cases rather than deducing
it from first principles. In this sense, they function much like
Mormon prophets and priesthood leaders.
Working within the common law system, a jurist doesn’t pro-
vide a conceptual foundation from which the law is deduced.
Rather, her task is to uncover the latent normative judgments that
emerge spontaneously from the accretion of particular prece-
dents. These generalized statements of legal principles and poli-
cies can then serve as a basis for either criticizing or extending
current practice. They are not, however, the common law itself.
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Rather, the common law always continues on as a practice that is
“more like a muddle than a system.”14 This process is true
whether our jurist is a lawyer, a law professor, or even a judge re-
f lecting on the law.15
Hence, for example, a common law lawyer would note that, in
case after case, when a litigant in a contract case claims that the oral
agreement of the parties was substantially different than the writ-
ten contract, the judges always side with the writing over the oral
testimony. This regularity might then be stated as a rule. In many
cases, the theorist would note, the effect of this rule is to enforce
contract terms that may differ from the subjective understanding
of the parties. Such an outcome seems inconsistent with the notion
that contract law is primarily concerned with advancing the auton-
omous choices of individuals. On the other hand, by privileging
the written terms, the common law rule contributes to certainty in
commercial transactions and reduces the cost to the courts of re-
solving contract disputes, throwing those costs back onto the par-
ties who have an incentive to reduce their actual intentions to a
clear writing. What emerges from this analysis is a conclusion that,
at least in this area of contract interpretation, concern for eco-
nomic efficiency seems paramount over concern for individual
choice. This conclusion, however, is not the law. It is not even a ma-
jor premise from which the law is deduced. It is simply an articula-
tion of the latent normative logic of the law as it now stands. The
case comes first, and it is only afterward that we discover princi-
ples. The “living oracles,” however, with their focus on particular
cases, may well move the law in a different direction in the future.
This method of interpretation can be applied to the practices
and institutions of Mormonism. The goal would not be to provide
first principles from which correct conclusions can be deduced.
Rather it would be to articulate the inchoate normative logic of
these practices and institutions. Two concrete examples can illus-
trate the kind of analysis that I envision. Suppose that one is inter-
ested in Mormon conceptions of property and contract. These in-
stitutions stand at the center of modern market economies, and
one might wonder what Mormonism has to say about them. At
first glance, Mormon theology—or at any rate the extremely small
literature on systematic Mormon theology—seems to have very lit-
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tle to say about either property or contract. The analogy to legal
interpretation, however, suggests that one should search for
Mormon ideas not only in Mormon discourse but also in Mormon
practice.
One place to look for materials would be the nineteenth-cen-
tury Church court system, which among other things decided
property and contract disputes between Latter-day Saints.16 One
will search the records of these cases in vain for anything that
even distantly resembles a theory of property or a theory of con-
tract. The priesthood leaders resolving these disputes decided
the case without recourse to any elaborate set of first principles.
Nevertheless, in examining their practices and the institutions
they sought to create, we can discern a distinctive set of normative
choices that one might unapologetically label as Mormon con-
cepts of property and contract. Consider first the case of Oliver
Cowdery’s excommunication.
III
In 1831, Joseph Smith received a revelation setting forth what
became known as the “Law of Consecration and Stewardship”
(D&C 42).17All members of the Church were to “consecrate”
their property to the Lord by executing a deed that transferred
land and other assets to the Church. Each member then received
in return a parcel of property as his particular “stewardship.”18 In
Jackson County, Missouri, which an earlier revelation had desig-
nated as the location of the New Jerusalem to be founded by the
Saints, members received their stewardships as part an effort to
build up Zion. In 1833, after growing tensions with the original
settlers in the county, an ad hoc militia violently expelled the Mor-
mons from the area.19 The loss of Jackson County precipitated a
crisis for many Latter-day Saints. How were they to build up Zion
if the revealed location of the New Jerusalem was held by “the
Gentiles”? Coupled with other events, this loss caused a leader-
ship crisis within the church that came to a head in 1838.20
In the resulting struggle, Oliver Cowdery found himself on
trial before a Church court. Among the charges leveled against
him was that he had denied the faith and abandoned Zion by sell-
ing his stewardship. Oliver responded with a lengthy letter in
which he refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the high council
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that was trying his case, insisting that no Church court could inter-
fere in his “temporal affairs.” The letter contained the following,
revealing passage on property rights: “Now sir the lands in our
Country are allodial in the strictest construction of the term, and
have not the least shadow of feudal tenours attached to them, con-
sequently, they may be disposed of by deeds of conveyance with-
out the consent or even approbation of a superior.”21 Scholars
have long found his reference to “allodial” land and feudal ten-
ures puzzling.22 Oliver’s objections, however, go to the heart of
how Mormon practices conceptualized property.
Feudal tenures refer to medieval doctrines in the common law
by which the ownership of land created certain kinds of reciprocal
social obligations. The way in which one owned property defined
one’s place in the social system. Every freeman “held his land of”
someone else. A deed, for example, might specify that Sir Cedric
held Blackacre “in knight’s service” of Lord Lothgar. What this
meant was that Sir Cedric’s ownership of Blackacre created an obli-
gation on his part of loyalty and military service to Lord Lothgar.
In turn, Lord Lothgar—at least in theory—had obligations to pro-
tect Sir Cedric and provide him with justice in disputes with his
neighbors. The result was a thick set of social duties centered on
the ownership of land. As one legal historian has written: “When
feudalism was at full tide, it was clearly much more than a system of
providing legal title in land; indeed, the sense of mutual personal
obligation between lord and vassal may have been even more es-
sential than the granting of fiefs in return for promises of ser-
vices.”23 Legally speaking, however, these were not free-f loating
rights or obligations. They inhered in the concept of property it-
self. To own Blackacre meant to have a certain set of obligations in
the community where Blackacre was located. By contrast, holders
of allodial land “were free from the exactions and burdens to which
the holders of fiefs were subject, yet they did not enjoy the protec-
tion of a superior.”24 Hence, allodial land had no “feudal tenures,”
rendering its owner free of both the social obligations and the so-
cial benefits inherent in the lord-vassal relationship.
During the period prior to his Church trial, Cowdery was fol-
lowing an informal course of reading of the kind standard among
would-be frontier attorneys.25In the perennial manner of law stu-
    	
	  	   
dents, he was no doubt eager to show off newly mastered jargon,
but his appeal to allodial property and feudal tenures recognized
that the Church was asking him to fundamentally reconceptualize
property in terms very different than those that prevailed in
American culture. Following the formulation given by Locke a
century earlier, the American Revolution had rallied around the
vindication of rights to “life, liberty, and property.” In this trinity
of values, however, property had a particular meaning, one medi-
ated in part through the legal concepts that Cowdery invoked. For
example in 1765, John Adams attacked the Stamp Act in A Disser-
tation on the Canon and Feudal Law that identified the tyranny of
Parliament as the latest chapter in a story of repression with its
roots in feudal tenures. “All ranks and degrees held their lands by
a variety of duties and services, all tending to bind the chains the
faster on every order of mankind,” Adams noted.26 The dire re-
sult of this system, he continued, was “a state of total ignorance of
every thing divine and human.” In contrast, among those who
“holden their lands allodially,” a man was “the sovereign lord and
proprietor of the ground he occupied.”27
A generation later, in his widely used American edition of
Blackstone’s Commentaries, William and Mary law professor St.
George Tucker noted with pride that, due to the “republican
spirit,” feudal tenures had been abolished by statute in America,
and “it was expected that every trace of that system would have
been abolished in this country when the republic was estab-
lished.”28 Likewise, in his 1828 Commentaries on American Law,
Chancellor James Kent traced in detail the end of feudal tenures
in America and the rise of allodial holding, marking it as a resto-
ration of ancient lost liberties. “Thus, by one of those singular rev-
olutions incident to human affairs,” he wrote, “allodial estates . . .
regained their primitive estimation in the minds of free-
men.”29 As an aspiring attorney, Oliver was well aware of such
standard legal texts as Tucker’s and Kent’s commentaries, and his
rhetorical fillip on allodial land was likely a deliberate allusion to
this line of thinking.30
The most salient feature of this “republican” vision of owner-
ship was that it constituted a sharp limit on social obligation.
Whatever a man’s obligations in the public realm, once within the
private space of his allodial castle, he could do as he wished.
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Blackstone, the most important reference work for generations of
American attorneys, insisted: “So great moreover is the regard of
the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least vio-
lation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole com-
munity. . . . In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual
ought to yield to that of the community.”31 Nor were these merely
“legal” categories. For a lawyer of Oliver’s generation, legal posi-
tivism had not yet shattered the identification of the common law
with natural law. Accordingly, this absolutist conception of prop-
erty marked off more than simply the positive law of the land. It
represented a fundamental feature of moral reality. In effect, to
own property was to have a sphere, however limited, beyond the
reach of the community.
Mormonism did not try to reinstitute feudal tenures. It did,
however, reject the notion of property as a boundary or limit of
communal duties. Furthermore, in common with the feudal sys-
tem, it fragmented the moral concept of ownership and trans-
formed property into a nexus of obligations to others. In Joseph
Smith’s revelations nobody owns property in the absolutist way
championed by Blackstone.32 Rather, one 1834 revelation de-
clared, “I, the Lord, stretched out the heavens, and built the earth,
my very handiwork; all things therein are mine” (D&C 104:14).
The institutions of consecrated properties and stewardships
served not only to redistribute wealth among the Saints, but also
to redefine their relationship to property. In the same revelation,
God declared that property is given to the Saints “that every man
may give an account unto me of the stewardship which is ap-
pointed unto him” (D&C 104:12). One did not hold property as a
way of creating a private sphere free of communal obligations.
Rather the purpose of property was to create obligations to oth-
ers and to become accountable to God. (See also D&C 42:32.) Ob-
ligations associated with ownership included the duty to “admin-
ister to the poor and needy,” assisting to purchase property “for
the public benefit of the church,” and most inclusively for “the
building up of the New Jerusalem” (D&C 42:34, 35).
While the concrete institutional arrangements of “the law of
consecration and stewardship” were short lived, the underlying
approach to property continued within Mormon practice. For ex-
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ample, in 1838 Joseph Smith published a revelation that replaced
the earlier system of consecrations and stewardships with a sys-
tem of tithing requiring Mormons to “pay one-tenth of their inter-
est annually” into the coffers of the community (D&C 119:4).
However, the rule, which is still followed by Latter-day Saints, did
not repudiate the earlier concepts of stewardship and subsidiary
ownership. Rather, the revelation explicitly linked the new regime
to the older rules requiring that “surplus property be put in the
hands of the bishop” (D&C 119:1) and to a notion of property
rights linked to the obligation to build up Zion:
Verily I say unto you, it shall come to pass that all . . . shall be tithed
of their surplus properties . . . .
And I say unto you, if my people observe not this law, to keep it
holy, and by this law sanctify the land of Zion unto me, that my stat-
utes and my judgments may be kept thereon, that it may be most
holy, behold, verily I say unto you, it shall not be a land of Zion unto
you. (D&C 119:8–9)
Thus, in a single passage, “properties” are associated with di-
vine obligations (“my statutes and judgments”) and the creation of
a community defined by reciprocal obligations of love and service
(“a land of Zion”). In place of the conception of property as a bul-
wark of individual freedom, Mormonism offers property as a
nexus of obligation to God and to one’s neighbors. The 1838 reve-
lation is particularly striking in this regard because it came in the
context of a retreat from cooperative economic arrangements to-
ward a regime of greater personal control of property. Neverthe-
less, it carried forward the notion that to care for the poor and
build up Zion is not something that one chooses to do with prop-
erty that is truly one’s own. Rather, everything one owns is a stew-
ardship from God, given for the purpose of making one account-
able to him. The obligation to build Zion inheres in the concept of
property itself.
IV
The nineteenth-century Mormon court system can be simi-
larly mined for Mormon conceptions of contract. In contrast to
their detailed discussion of matters relating to property, Mormon
scriptures have comparatively little to say about contract. In this
sense, they mirror the law codes of the Old Testament, which like-
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wise have little to say about enforcing voluntary agreements. Nev-
ertheless, Joseph Smith’s revelation on the law of consecration
and stewardship clearly assumes an economic order involving
commerce and voluntary exchange, commanding “thou shalt pay
for that which thou shalt receive of thy brother” (D&C 42:54). An-
other revelation speaks of a store to be set up to serve the Saints in
Zion (D&C 57:8–10). While contracts exist only in the margins of
Mormon scripture, covenant is an enormously important concept
in Latter-day Saint theology. Most dramatically, an 1832 revela-
tion suggests that sacred promises bind even God. “I, the Lord,
am bound when ye do what I say; but when ye do not what I say, ye
have no promise” (D&C 82:10). This reverential attitude toward
the power of promises carried over into Mormon contract cases.
On December 7, 1863, a local schoolteacher filed a complaint
with the bishop of a ward in northern Utah against a local farmer
(both teacher and farmer were Mormons) “for unchristianlike
conduct, unworthy of a Latter Day Saint, in refusing to pay me a
small debt due for School teaching in wheat f lour or corn.” The
farmer admitted to having promised to pay but insisted that
“prior to his calling on me for wheat, I had contracted my f lour
what I had to spare to raise a certain amount of money that I
owed.” A trial ensued, and testimony before the bishop’s court re-
vealed that the farmer had initially told the schoolteacher that he
had no grain and had then tried to find a buyer who would pay for
his wheat either with livestock or sufficient ready cash. When the
schoolteacher found out, he demanded the wheat according to
the earlier agreement; but by this time, the farmer had found will-
ing buyers at the higher price, a group of Gentile miners. In his
complaint to the bishop’s court, the schoolteacher insisted that he
had “very much needed” the wheat and expressed dismay that it
had gone to “speculators from the Bannock Minz.” Other Mor-
mons testified that they had offered to buy the corn with cash or
calves, but the farmer had refused them, either because the
amount of money offered was too little or because the calves were
too young. The clerk recorded that the bishop, after deliberating,
“said it was a very plain case, many cases come up rather misty but
this is a very plain case. . . . I think so and more than enough has
been said to prove that [the farmer] has told in a number of in-
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stances that which is not true and [the bishop] moved that we
disfellowship [him] until he make satisfaction.”33
The little drama described in this case is common enough in
contract litigation. Able promises Baker some commodity at a
fixed price. At the time of delivery, however, the market price of
the commodity has risen, and Able breaches his contract to Baker
to make a better deal elsewhere. The bishop’s approach to the
case, however, deviates significantly from the common law of con-
tracts. Holmes famously declared, “The duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you
do not keep it—and nothing else.”34 While laypersons commonly
speak of “enforcing” a contract, in point of fact the common law
generally will not force a breaching party to literally do what he
promised in his contract. Rather, the usual remedy is damages. A
breaching party must—in theory, at least—compensate the disap-
pointed promisee for the lost value of the bargain but is always
free to simply breach and pay. Furthermore, the breach of con-
tract—while giving rise to liability—is not regarded as a legal
wrong in and of itself. For example, with a few extremely rare ex-
ceptions, the mere breach of contract is not a crime or even a civil
wrong giving rise to a fine nor do courts inquire into the culpabil-
ity of breach in any but the rarest of cases. In short, one is always
free to simply walk away from one’s agreements, albeit at the risk
of a suit for damages.
The justifiability of the common law’s preference for compen-
satory damages is hotly contested among legal scholars. There are
at least two possible arguments. The first is that contract law’s pri-
mary concern is and ought to be to provide contracting parties
with incentives to behave in economically efficient ways. In this
view, society does not want people to keep all of their promises.
Rather, it only wishes to see promises kept when the benefits of
doing so exceed the costs. Sometimes, however, it will be econom-
ically efficient for parties to breach their contracts; and in such
cases, we wish them to do so. Damages incentivize performance
but not too much, encouraging so-called “efficient breach-
es.”35Alternatively, some argue that, in a liberal society, the law
should not concern itself with the personal morality of its citi-
zens, confining itself to protecting them against invasions of their
rights by others. The duty to keep a promise, being grounded in
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personal virtue, is not something that the law should concern it-
self with. It will provide compensation to those whose legitimate
expectations have been disappointed by breach, but it ought not
to act to keep the promisor from breaking his promise merely on
the basis of moral objections.36
Thus, there is a sense in which both of these justifications treat
contracts as extremely thin obligations between two essentially un-
related individuals. Both take an amoral attitude toward promises,
treating them as either instrumentally useful in some cases to
achieve economic goals or alternatively as matters about which a
properly constituted political community ought to be indifferent.
In this view, the actions of the farmer were altogether benign, even
perhaps commendable from an economic point of view. To be
sure, he ought to pay the schoolteacher something, but the com-
mon law would attach no stigma per se to his shopping his grain to
the highest bidder, notwithstanding his prior promise to give it to
the schoolteacher. The bishop, in contrast, viewed the farmer’s ac-
tions in starkly moralistic terms. The farmer had not only breached
his contract, but he had also lied. Furthermore, the remedy im-
posed was not simply an order to pay some amount of damages.
Rather, he was cut off from the community until the man he had
wronged determined that he was once again eligible to enter it. Un-
der the rules that prevailed at the time, of course, the school-
teacher’s power over the farmer’s continued fellowship was not ab-
solute. Someone who felt that he had been abused under a judg-
ment from a Church court could always file a counter complaint
for, in the words of one such action, “unchristianlike conduct in . . .
depriving me of my fellowship in the Ch. Of J.C. of LDS.”37 Still,
the bishop’s resolution of the case gave more to the schoolteacher
than a mere claim for money damages and had a punitive aspect
foreign to the common law of contracts.
The Mormon preference for moralizing contracts shows up in
other areas where Mormon adjudication differed sharply from
secular legal doctrines. Where possible, Church courts required
breaching parties to perform their obligations, awarding dam-
ages only when performance was no longer possible.38 Even when
damages were awarded, the Church courts took a tougher line
with breaching parties than do secular courts. For example, under
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the rule announced in the famous English case of Hadley v.
Baxendale, a breaching party’s liability includes few of the second-
ary negative effects of his breach because the law sharply limits
so-called “consequential damages.” The decisions in the Church
courts were quite different.
For example, in October 1847, the Salt Lake High Council
heard a complaint against a man who had apparently breached a
contract to deliver some gunpowder in his possession, selling it in-
stead to a third party. He offered to pay for it, but the council went
on to hold that he “be held responsible for any damage that may ac-
crue from the want of it, until paid,” greatly enlarging the man’s lia-
bility beyond what would be available under the common
law.39 Elsewhere, Church courts awarded punitive damages for
breach of contract, something almost totally unheard of in the com-
mon law.40 Likewise, Mormon courts regularly enforced debts that
had been discharged by bankruptcy or even death, on the theory
that Latter-day Saints had a moral duty to meet their obligations
come what may.41 This highly moralistic approach to obligations
was never tied to communitarian economic institutions and has sur-
vived in contemporary Mormon discourse, notwithstanding its
sharp divergence from secular ideas of contract.42
V
Obviously, the interpretation of these two Church court cases
is open to debate. They do illustrate, however, the way in which
one can extract fairly abstract ideas from a concrete set of prac-
tices that do not themselves articulate the abstract ideas. Hence,
Cowdery’s property dispute reveals an idea of property as a nexus
of communal obligations rather than as a boundary of those obli-
gations. The dispute between the farmer and the schoolteacher
shows a contract as a locus of moral testing and obligation, rather
than the amoral vision of a contract as a mere facilitator of effi-
cient behavior or as another boundary line among rights-holding
strangers. In short, the analogy to legal interpretation shows how
the nitty-gritty response of Mormonism to concrete questions of
practice contains the germ of more generalized discussions.
Such an approach has a number of attractive features. First
and most importantly, it shows that Mormonism has something to
say on subjects where it appears initially taciturn. While a philos-
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opher might view the relentlessly practical and practice-focused
Mormon landscape as a mute wasteland, a legal theorist can see it
as a vast reserve of material waiting to be rendered articulate.
Second, a jurisprudential approach largely sidesteps the
thorny issue of authority within Mormonism.43 At a conceptual
level, it rests on the authority of the “living oracles” and their abil-
ity to invest the prosaic, practical aspects of Mormonism with the
divine. The concrete confrontation over the sale of Cowdery’s
parcel of Jackson County land or between the farmer and the
schoolteacher serve to fill in the “outlines of our duties [that] are
written.” They do not, however, purport to uncover the first prin-
ciples that ought to guide the decisions of the living oracles. The
legal analogy provides no critical leverage against the authorities
of the Church. Those with ecclesiastical offices giving them stew-
ardship over a particular practice or institution may always
change it and, in so doing, will provide new cases to be inter-
preted and enfolded into our ongoing understanding of what
Mormonism has to say about the world. Hence, even at the con-
ceptual level, the jurisprudential analogy assumes that the prac-
tice of Mormonism is logically and normatively prior to any
theory that one might have about it.
Third, this approach allows us to sharpen our normative anal-
ysis of Mormon history while sidestepping the morass of debates
over historiography and historicity. If we adopt the stance of a le-
gal theorist, successful examinations of the past no longer consist
of providing an “objective,” “neutral,” “scholarly,” or “historical”
assessment of it. The jurisprudential approach can mine past
practices and institutions in normative terms without intellectual
embarrassment because it is, from first to last, an exercise in nor-
mative archeology rather than ostensibly disinterested history.
Past practices and institutions become interesting primarily as
the instantiation of a particular constellation of normative
choices. It is this constellation of normative choices, rather than
the concrete historical details and their interpretation, that is of
interest. In a sense, institutions and practices become more akin
to arguments to be appreciated and evaluated rather than events
to be explained on causal or historical grounds. Finally, and most
importantly, the turn to legal interpretation helps to render artic-
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ulate what was previously mute and reveals Mormon practices
and institutions—and by extension Mormonism itself—as “worthy
of the interest of an intelligent [person].”44
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